Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars have argued that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical. Neither cost-sharing nor reciprocity in isolation can solve the problem, but together they have that potential. We introduce new network notions of reciprocity relations to better understand this.
Introduction
You receive an email from your boss stating that he must nominate exactly two sta¤ as trade union representatives as soon as possible. All sta¤ would like that someone represents them on the union, but the question is who? If no-one else volunteers, or if at least two others volunteer, there is no sense in you volunteering. If only one person volunteers then the outcome depends on you. You click reply and hesitate... how do your colleagues choose?
The story illustrates the participation problem in the private provision of discrete public goods. Grander scale examples might include international economic agreements, open source software, and political representation. A useful framework for analysing the issue is found in the seminal work of Palfrey & Rosenthal (1984) (P&R). They identify two types of equilibria, that where no-one participates and that where exactly those needed for provision do so. This dichotomy exposes two fundamental problems, concerning e¢ ciency (since all individuals would be better o¤ with provision than without) and coordination (since there are multiple provision equilibria). The problems can neither be solved by evoking the re…nement of strict equilibrium nor by using refunds, that is returning costs if there are insu¢ cient participants. However, P&R show that taken together, these two factors can achieve e¢ ciency: with refunds, all strict equilibria are e¢ cient.
These important insights presume that individuals maximise material payo¤s. But scholars argue that in the context of public goods provision it is natural for additional motives such as reciprocity to come into play (Sugden 1984) . 1 Reciprocity can be modelled as the desire to be kind to those who are kind to you and unkind to those who are unkind to you (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004 (D&K), Falk & Fischbacher 2006) . In settings where it is bene…cial that everyone contributes, the application of reciprocity theory is straightforward and leads to conditional cooperation: players desire to contribute increases as others' contributions go up. Empirical support for such behaviour has been provided (Keser & (Ledyard 1995) . However, in discrete public goods games it isn't useful, but rather wasteful, to contribute if many others do so anyway, so the implications of reciprocity are not obvious. Will reci-procity make it easier to decide how to reply to your boss' email? Will it solve the e¢ ciency and coordination problems? Answers require systematic analysis.
We use the workhorse model of P&R and conceptualise reciprocity as in the D&K model. Cost-sharing, where individuals reduce each others' cost-burden if the number of participants exceeds that needed for provision, proves crucial. P&R's insights are robust to reciprocity and cost-sharing, taken individually. However, with both reciprocity and cost-sharing in the picture, conclusions are dramatically di¤erent. There may exist a unique e¢ cient re…ned equilibrium so the coordination problem can be solved. But results on this potential are marvelously intricate, with possibilities as well as dead ends in the form of multiplicity or non-existence.
To untangle structure, we introduce and study new network notions of reciprocity relationships that describe the players' attitudes towards each other. Methodologically, we are thus connected to an infant literature on games with networks of social preferences (Leider et al. 2009 , Bourlès & Bramoullé 2013 . Among other things, our approach demonstrates the coordinating power of "reciprocity cliques" in a world of non-reciprocal players and how "reciprocity alienation" can impede coordination.
Our uniqueness results may seem surprising for those who believe that "in standard examples, the notion of reciprocal preferences tends to increase the number of equilibria" (Sobel 2005 , p. 410). We examine an economically important class of games that under standard preferences seems intrinsically plagued with multiple equilibria, yet reciprocity potentially o¤ers a solution.
Section 2 recaps P&R and adds cost-sharing (2.1), then de…nes and highlights important properties of reciprocity preferences (2.2 & 2.3). Section 3 presents results, on reciprocity in P&R (3.1) and on reciprocity and costsharing (3.2-3) . Section 4 examines welfare (4.1) and other social preferences (4.2), before we conclude in Section 5.
Model 2.1 P&R and cost-sharing
We …rst recall P&R's classic participation game. Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be the set of players, with n 3. Player i's strategy set is S i = f0; 1g where 1 corresponds to participating in provision and 0 to not doing so. We focus on pure strategies throughout. Let S = i2N S i . Write s = (s 1 ; s 2; :::; s n ) for a pro…le of strategies.
The threshold number of participants for provision of the public good is w, where 1 < w < n. Let the cost of participation be x 2 (0; 1) and each player receives an additional payo¤ of 1 if the good is provided. Let i be player i's material payo¤ function.
P&R introduce two variants of their game di¤ering in whether or not costs are refunded when there are fewer than w participants. To de…ne payo¤ functions, let m denote the number of players that participate. With no refunds, player i's material payo¤ function is de…ned by Any pro…le where m = 0 or m = w is a Nash equilibrium, and in fact also a strict equilibrium.
P&R show that refunds imply the ine¢ cient no participation outcome is no longer a strict equilibrium. With refunds, i's material payo¤ function is de…ned by
Refunds:
i (s) = 
While any pro…le where m = w remains a strict equilibrium, m = 0 does not because deviation to participation would be costless. All strict equilibria are thus e¢ cient. We will additionally consider a counterpart to refunds for m > w, costsharing, where costs in excess of the provision cost are returned in equal shares to the participating players when m > w. Player i's material payo¤ function is then de…ned by
Cost-sharing:
In some contexts cost-sharing is very natural. For instance, in our opening example 2 workers were needed to be union representatives. Suppose that 4 workers volunteer. Distributing the union tasks between the 4 seems more reasonable than making all 4 work on every task. If players are motivated by material payo¤s alone, pure strategy Nash and strict equilibria are una¤ected by cost-sharing as it only a¤ects payo¤s when m > w and such pro…les are neither equilibria nor attractive pro…les to deviate to given the waste involved. 2 However with reciprocity motivation cost-sharing will matter.
Reciprocity: de…nitions
We next incorporate preferences for reciprocity. Following D&K, 3 when player i plays strategy s i and holds (point) belief (b ij ) j6 =i 2 Q j6 =i S j about other players'strategies, i's kindness to player j is
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (4) is the material payo¤ that i believes that j receives. To de…ne kindness, this payo¤ must be compared to some reference point. The reference point is the second term, the average of the highest and the lowest material payo¤ i believes he could "give" to j. If ij (:) > 0, i is kind to j, if ij (:) < 0, i is unkind to j and if ij (:) = 0, i has zero kindness to j.
To illustrate, take the game with no refunds (material payo¤ function (1)). Let n = 3, w = 2 and x = 1 2 . Suppose that player 1 believes that only player 3 is participating (b 12 = 0, b 13 = 1). Player 1 is then kind to both players if he participates ( 12 (1; (0; 1)) = 1 
).
2 It would however a¤ect Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, as allowed for in P&R, and also has implications in related games. For example, Shinohara (2009) where players have heterogenous valuations of the public good and Makris (2009) where there is incomplete information over whether or not players are altruistic. 3 D&K's theory of reciprocity applies to a rather general class of extensive game forms. Our focus on a speci…c class of games a¤ords us two simpli…cations: (i) we need not condition strategies and beliefs on histories as the game has simultaneous moves; (ii) we need not discuss D&K's notion of "ine¢ cient strategies" (p. 276) as there are no such strategies.
Analogously to kindness, when i holds (point) belief b ij about j's strategy and (point) belief (c ijk ) k6 =j 2 Q k6 =j S k about j's belief other players' strategies, i's perceived kindness of j towards i is
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (5) is the material payo¤ that i believes that j believes that i receives. The reference point is the average of the highest and the lowest material payo¤ that i believes that j believes that he could give to i. If iji (:) > 0, i perceives that j is kind to him... etc.
Player i's utility is the sum of his material and reciprocity payo¤s:
where Y ij 0 is i's reciprocity sensitivity towards j. If Y ij > 0, a preference for reciprocation is captured by i's utility increasing when ij (:) and iji (:) are non-zero with matching signs, re ‡ecting mutual kindness or unkindness. The assumption that Y ij is common knowledge is clearly restrictive. It does however make sense with a small group of familiar players, for example a work team or the set of chief politicians. It may also be approximately true for people who self-select into a group. Might people who work for a charity have similar Y ij ? Common knowledge is perhaps more likely when preferences are very similar. Extending the model to asymmetric information is beyond our scope, but an important avenue for future work.
Finally, we state the two solution concepts we use. Note that we may write s = (s i ; s i ) where s i is a pro…le of strategies for all players except i.
The …rst condition requires that i is best-responding given others'strategies and his beliefs. The second demands that players hold correct beliefs. If for all i; j 2 N , Y ij = 0, then De…nition 1 describes a Nash equilibrium (+ correct beliefs) in a game where utility equals material payo¤s. While a unilateral deviation from a SRE cannot increase the deviator's payo¤, such a deviation from a SSRE leads to an actual loss:
If for all i; j 2 N , Y ij = 0, De…nition 2 describes a strict equilibrium (+ correct beliefs) in a game where utility equals material payo¤s.
Reciprocity: highlighted properties
We now draw attention to properties of reciprocity theory in our model that will help in understanding results.
Psychological game theory
Reciprocity theory (Rabin 1993 (Rabin , D&K 2004 ) is developed within the framework of psychological game theory (Geanakopolos et al. 1989 , Battigalli & Dufwenberg 2009 ), where in contrast to classical game theory utilities depend not only on actions chosen, but potentially also on belief hierarchies. Consider the following example for a motivational dependence that psychological games can capture but classical games cannot. (0 + 0) = 0 . In a psychological game 1 may react di¤erently in these two cases. Indeed, D&K permit negative reciprocity in the former but not in the latter (applying (6)). Classical game theory would not allow distinct reactions since 1 believes the same action pro…le is played in both cases.
Pivotality and kindness
Reciprocity incentives in Example 0 depend on the perceived ability of player 2 to in ‡uence player 1's material payo¤, his pivotality. 4 Non-pivotality will drive many of our results. Payo¤ functions (1)- (3) imply i is non-pivotal for j's material payo¤ if the good will either: (a) not be provided regardless of i's strategy choice, or; (b) be provided regardless of i's strategy choice and j is not participating so incurs no costs, or; (c) be provided regardless of i's strategy choice and j participates but there is no cost-sharing so i cannot reduce j's cost-share by participating.
Applying cases (a)-(c) to kindness functions (4) and (5), we can establish two lemmas showing that non-pivotality implies zero kindness. These will be useful when stating and proving later results.
If i believes he is non-pivotal for j's material payo¤ then both his strategies have a kindness towards j equal to zero, ij (:) = 0 (apply (4)).
Lemma 1 (Zero kindness) For some i; j 2 N , (b ij ) j6 =i and all s i 2 S i , ij (:) = 0 if and only if i believes that either:
(a) there are fewer than w 1 participants excluding i, or that, (b) there are at least w participants excluding i and j is not participating, or that, (c) there are at least w participants excluding i and j is participating, but there is no cost-sharing.
Similarly if i believes that j believes that j is non-pivotal for i's material payo¤, both of j's strategies have a perceived kindness towards i equal to zero, iji (:) = 0.
Lemma 2 (Zero perceived kindness) For some i; j 2 N; (c ijk ) k6 =j and all b ij 2 S j , iji (:) = 0 if and only if i believes that j believes that either:
(a) there are fewer than w 1 participants excluding j, or that, (b) there are at least w participants excluding j and i is not participating, or that, (c) there are at least w participants excluding j and i is participating but there is no cost-sharing.
It follows from these lemmas that either both strategies have zero (perceived) kindness, or one is (perceived as) kind and the other unkind (see (4) and (5)). It also follows from the lemmas that when beliefs are in equilibrium, ij (:) = 0 if and only if jij (:) = 0: If for some players i and j either of the lemmas hold, then j o¤ers i no reciprocity incentive (because ij (:) iji (:) = 0 in (6)). Furthermore, if this is true for all j, then i's strategy choice is determined by material payo¤s alone even if Y ij > 0 for some j (see (6)). It does not however follow that i's behaviour in SRE (SSRE) is identical to that in NE (strict equilibria) since others'behaviour may still be motivated by reciprocity incentives and thus i's best response may di¤er.
Results
Does reciprocity matter in discrete public good games? The answer is essentially no in P&R's setting (3.1). The power of reciprocity is unlocked if one considers cost-sharing, as we show …rst relying on examples (3.2) and then via formal statements that generalise those examples (3.3). All proofs are found in the appendix; we provide only the main intuition in the text.
Reciprocity in P&R
The following proposition characterises reciprocity equilibria in P&R's game.
Proposition 1 (Reciprocity in P&R) (i) With no refunds, the set of SRE equals the set of SSRE and is independent of Y ij . (ii) With refunds, the set of SSRE is independent of Y ij .
It follows from the proposition, and the insight that P&R's model may be seen as the special case where for all i; j 2 N , Y ij = 0, that P&R's results are robust to the incorporation of reciprocity. Without refunds there are both equilibrium e¢ ciency and coordination problems; refunds and strictness deal with the e¢ ciency problem. The intuition is as follows:
Without refunds, ine¢ cient no-participation remains an equilibrium despite reciprocity as each player believes he is not pivotal, thus faces no reciprocity incentives (Lemma 1(a)). Furthermore, since deviation incurs a material cost, no participation is also a SSRE.
With refunds, the set of SRE does depend on Y ij . 5 However, this is of little relevance to us as reasoning analogous to the previous paragraph demonstrates the ine¢ cient SRE still exists. We thus have the same motivation to focus on SSRE in Proposition 1(ii) as P&R had to focus on strict equilibria. To see that ine¢ cient pro…les cannot be SSRE, reason as follows. If there are more than w participants, each participant believes he is not pivotal (Lemma 1(b) and 1(c)) and thus has no reciprocity incentives. Since deviating increases his material payo¤, this is not an SSRE. For a pro…le with a number of participants strictly between 0 and w, each participant again believes he is not pivotal (Lemma 1(a) ). This time deviating gives the same material payo¤ and thus the player incurs no strict loss in utility. Finally, for a no-participation pro…le, deviation by any does not strictly reduce his utility. All that remains are the e¢ cient pro…les, those with w participants.
The central reason why reciprocity has no bite in tackling multiplicity is zero (perceived) kindness due to non-participant non-pivotality in strategy pro…les with w participants. To illustrate, let n = 3, w = 2 and consider a candidate equilibrium where only players 2 and 3 participate. Player 2 is pivotal and equilibrium beliefs imply 1 perceives 2 as kind. However, even if Y 12 > 0, 1 believes he is not pivotal for 2's payo¤ (Lemma 1(c)) thus cannot reciprocate 2's kindness. Furthermore, equilibrium beliefs also mean that 2 acknowledges 1's perceived non-pivotality (Lemma 2(c)) and so does not treat his non-participation as unkind. Thus 1 provides 2 with no reciprocity incentive to deviate, even if Y 21 > 0. By contrast (anticipating subsections 3.2-3) if there were cost-sharing these latent reciprocity incentives are reignited in such instances by allowing 1 to in ‡uence 2's payo¤. This may motivate deviations and gain traction on multiplicity.
Reciprocity & cost-sharing: examples
Reciprocity has a potentially dramatic e¤ect under cost-sharing. Not only does the set of SSRE now depend on Y ij , but uniqueness becomes a possibility. The coordination problem can thus potentially be solved.
Our results will depend on preferences, speci…cally the distribution of players' reciprocity sensitivities, the "reciprocity network". It is useful to represent this using weighted directed graphs. Vertices represent players and their labels correspond to player labels. A directed edge originating from player i's vertex and ending at player j's vertex implies Y ij > 0. The edge label is Y ij . A reciprocity clique may represent a form of friendship. 6 It seems unlikely in hierarchical relationships such as those between a …rm and workers (cf. D&K 2000) but plausible among peers. A su¢ ciently strong reciprocity clique may overcome the coordination problem as we illustrate in Example 1.
Example 1: Let n = 3, w = 2 and the reciprocity network be as in Figure 1 . Full participation cannot be a SSRE as player 3 would deviate. Player 3 and just one of the clique members participating cannot be either, since the nonparticipant clique member's reciprocity gain from reducing the cost-share of the participating member is greater than his material cost of participation. This leaves only the clique participating as the unique SSRE. The coordination problem is solved.
Compare this to the case without cost-sharing. Only player 3 and one clique member participating would then remain SSRE (see discussion at the end of Section 3.1), so multiplicity would follow.
The existence of a clique is not generally su¢ cient for uniqueness as Example 2 will show. It also illustrates our second network notion of reciprocity.
Players being reciprocity alienated neither implies nor is implied by them having sel…sh preferences. For example, players in L having positive reciprocity sensitivities towards one another does not contradict alienation; and, a player not in L with a positive reciprocity sensitivity towards a player in L implies L is not alienated. Intuitively, the notion implies that players inside the alienated group provide no reciprocity incentives to those outside the group, and vice-versa.
Our next example adds a non-reciprocal player to Example 1 to illustrate the coordination problems caused by alienation and that a clique is not su¢ cient for coordination.
Example 2: Let n = 4, w = 2 and the reciprocity network be as in Figure  2 . Uniqueness is now impossible despite the reciprocity clique. A SSRE with only 1 and 2 participating exists; however, there also exists one where only 3 and 4 participate. Alienation implies there are no reciprocity incentives acting across the pairs to break the equilibria.
Although 2) has an incentive to deviate: the gain from reciprocating the kindness of player 3 (4) is greater than the material cost. All pro…les except where only the clique participate can be excluded, uniqueness thus re-emerges.
Example 3 illustrates how a clique being reciprocal towards non-clique players avoids alienation and can imply uniqueness. These precise numbers are not necessary for coordination (see Section 3.3 for uniqueness with general reciprocity networks).
The …nal example concerns networks with high reciprocity sensitivities. Given that multiple equilibria exist with standard preferences one may conjecture that su¢ ciently high reciprocity sensitivity solves the coordination problem. This is not necessarily true, however. Consider two cases, …rst w = 3. Three participants cannot be a SSRE as the non-participant deviates since his reciprocity gain from doing so outweighs his material cost. Full participation is the unique SSRE. Now suppose w = 2 and 3 players are participating. Participants have no incentive to deviate as their reciprocity gain from reciprocating the kindness of fellow participants is greater than the material cost. Non-participants do not deviate either since equilibrium beliefs imply they perceive a particular participant's kindness towards them as zero (Lemma 2(b)). Thus, there are multiple SSRE.
More generally high reciprocity gives uniqueness if and only if w = n 1; see Section 3.3. Example 4 also illustrates that there may be more than w participants in a unique SSRE. We show that any number between w and n can be consistent with uniqueness in the next section.
To summarise the insights from Examples 1-4.
1. Existence of a unique SSRE is possible with cost-sharing and reciprocity (Examples 1, 3 and 4).
Reciprocity alienation can prevent uniqueness (Example 2).
3. A su¢ ciently strong reciprocity clique with positive reciprocity sensitivities towards players outside the clique can imply a unique SSRE (Example 3).
4. High reciprocity sensitivities do not necessarily imply uniqueness or multiplicity of SSRE (Example 4).
Readers looking mainly for key intuitions exhibited by typical examples may now skip to Section 4. Readers interested in seeing some more general formal statements, plus further details, should continue to Section 3.3.
Reciprocity
and for all i 2 N nM ,
Pro…le s where m > w is a SSRE if and only if for all i 2 M ,
The conditions for a SSRE with m = w are understood as follows. Participant non-deviation (7) requires that the gain from reciprocating the kindness of other participants (who intentionally provide the good) and the material gain from provision, be greater than the loss of not reciprocating the unkindness of non-participants (who intentionally do not reduce the participant's costshare). Non-participant non-deviation (8) demands the material savings be greater than the reciprocity cost of not reciprocating participant kindness. As non-participants are not pivotal for each other's material payo¤s (Lemma 1(b)) they provide no reciprocity incentives to one another. For a SSRE with m > w a non-deviation condition is not needed for nonparticipants since each non-participant believes no-one thought they were pivotal for his payo¤ (Lemma 2(b)), implying zero perceived kindness. Participant non-deviation (9) requires the gain from reciprocating the kindness of fellow participants be greater than the material cost.
Note that Proposition 2 does not guarantee existence of SSRE. To see one instance of non-existence suppose that for all i; j 2 N , Y ij 2w, so that (8) does not hold. Then take x su¢ ciently small such that (9) does not hold.
Cliques coordinating a sel…sh world Examples 1 and 3 demonstrated the potential of a reciprocity clique to coordinate behaviour among sel…sh players. The next two results describe a fairly rich set of circumstances where this is true. 
There then exists a unique SSRE pro…le s where M = M 0 .
The class of networks referred to in Proposition 3 involves a clique M 0 of size w with (a) sel…sh non-clique players, (b) each clique member being su¢ ciently reciprocal towards each non-clique player, and (c) each clique member being su¢ ciently reciprocal towards the rest of the clique.
To understand why such networks imply uniqueness see Example 3 (which satis…es conditions (a)-(c) of Proposition 3) or reason as follows. Condition (a) implies that if there were more than w participants, a participating nonclique player would deviate. Condition (b) implies that if there were w participants and a clique member were not participating he would deviate to reciprocate the kindness of participating non-clique players ( (8) 
is violated).
Provision by the clique is thus the unique SSRE, with condition (a) guaranteeing that non-participants do not deviate, and condition (c) ensuring that participants do not either.
It is instructive to study (10) to appreciate what determines the level of intra-clique sensitivity needed to sustain the unique SSRE. A higher n or lower w implies a larger number of unkind non-clique players, increasing the incentive for clique members to deviate. A higher intra-clique sensitivity is thus required to prevent deviation. A higher x implies a decrease in the net material gain from provision, an increase in the unkindness of non-clique players and a decrease in the kindness of clique players. All these e¤ects increase clique members'incentive to deviate, thus once again, a higher clique sensitivity is required to sustain the unique SSRE.
Our next result, Proposition 4, will consider uniqueness with provision by a clique of size greater than w. To better understand the rationale for the class of networks that we will describe in the proposition, it is helpful to return to the networks of Proposition 3 and understand why analogous structures could not give uniqueness with a clique of size greater than w.
Condition (c) of Proposition 3 allows the clique to have homogenous or heterogenous intra-clique reciprocity sensitivities. Homogeneity may be inconsistent with uniqueness if the clique is of size greater than w. For the sharpest illustration of why, consider a clique of size w + 2 with homogenous intra-clique sensitivities. Condition (9) shows that the intra-clique sensitivity required for a SSRE with the entire clique participating is greater than that required for one with only w+1 clique members participating. Hence, if there exists a SSRE with the entire clique providing, it is not unique. This issue did not arise with a clique of size w (Proposition 3) since a proper subset participating is insu¢ cient for provision.
With appropriate heterogeneity, unique provision by a larger clique is possible. This is demonstrated by the special case examined in Proposition 4. Clique members are arranged in a "circle" and each member i is particularly reciprocal towards one of his "neighbours" (called i + in Proposition 4). 
The class of networks referred to in Proposition 4 involves a clique M 0 of size greater than w with (a) sel…sh non-clique players, (b) each clique member being su¢ ciently reciprocal towards each non-clique player, (c -) each clique member i being not too reciprocal towards the rest of the clique excluding one of his neighbours, i + , (c + ) each clique member i being su¢ ciently reciprocal towards one of his neighbours, i + . Conditions (c -) and (c + ) of Proposition 4 ensure clique member i's sensitivities towards the clique are su¢ ciently high for a SSRE with the entire clique participating ( (9) holds). That clique member i is highly reciprocal towards i + plays a key role in avoiding the multiplicity that we discussed with homogenous intra-clique sensitivities. To see this, consider a pro…le where only a proper subset of the clique participates. There must then be some participating player i whose neighbour, i + , is not participating. Condition (c -) then implies that i's reciprocity towards participants is not su¢ ciently high to prevent him deviating ((9) violated), thus this pro…le cannot be a SSRE.
To see that the clique provision SSRE is indeed unique, exclude remaining pro…les as follows. Condition (a) implies that provision by more than w participants with at least one non-clique player participating cannot be SSRE, as this player would deviate ((9) violated). Conditions (b) and (c + ), imply that w participant pro…les cannot be SSRE as a non-participating clique member would deviate ((8) violated). There is thus a unique SSRE.
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrate that for any n, w and x there always exist some reciprocity networks that give uniqueness under cost-sharing. The propositions allow for many constellations of Y ij since most the conditions impose only upper or lower bounds on sensitivities. Note also that the network architectures in the propositions are not necessary for uniqueness. For instance, the network in Example 4 with w = 3 gave uniqueness despite it not conforming to the propositions'architectures. Finally, since we consider strict SRE, uniqueness should hold for any small perturbation to the weights of the reciprocity network.
Coordination di¢ culties
Our insights on reciprocity cliques may make coordination seem easy. In general, however, coordination via reciprocity networks is far from trivial. We have already noted equilibrium existence problems. Here follow three negative observations of reciprocity networks where instead the coordination problem is very much alive, beginning with alienation.
Observation 1 (Reciprocity alienation)
If there exist two sets of reciprocity alienated players L 0 and L 00 , such that L 0 6 = L 00 and jL 0 j = jL 00 j = w, then there are multiple SSRE.
To see the logic behind the statement, simply note that provision by an alienated group of size w is a SSRE and multiplicity follows immediately if there are two such groups (e.g. Example 2).
Having reciprocity incentives throughout the set of players is clearly important to avoid this outcome. The conditions in Observation 1 are satis…ed more easily than it may seem. For example, at least w + 1 players with standard preferences towards whom no-one is particularly reciprocal is su¢ -cient. Su¢ ciently high reciprocity among all players is however not enough to prevent multiplicity as our next observation shows. When w = n 1 candidate SSRE with m = w are broken as by deviating nonparticipants reduce participants' cost-shares and reciprocate their kindness (8) , leaving only a SSRE with m = n, (7). When w < n 1, (9) implies that existence of a SSRE with m = w + 1 is guaranteed if for all i; j 2 N , Y ij > 2 (w + 1) =x, however there are many such equilibria (see e.g. Example 4 with w = 2).
A direct implication of Observation 2 is that for a high reciprocity network, provision of a public good which requires almost full participation may be easier than one that requires low participation. Our next observation points out that low participation public goods are also more di¢ cult to provide when preferences are homogenous. With homogenous preferences a unique SSRE cannot have less than n participants otherwise another SSRE would exist where at least one participant and non-participant exchange strategies. Furthermore, full participation cannot be a unique SSRE since the level of reciprocity required for equilibrium is increasing in the number of participants, (9), so there would also exist equilibria with fewer participants. Preference heterogeneity is thus often key to coordination via reciprocity networks.
Extensions

Welfare
We have so far implicitly de…ned e¢ ciency in terms of material payo¤s. This is not obvious given that utility functions are assumed to be a combination of both material and reciprocity payo¤s. While some scholars have argued that welfare should be de…ned on full utility functions (e.g. Rabin 1993, p. 1294), more generally the jury remains out on whether non-material payo¤s in social preference models should be included in normative analysis (Bernheim & Rangel 2005) .
If one were to de…ne e¢ ciency on full utility functions, it is important to recognise that utilities are a function of kindness and perceived kindness, which themselves are a function of both beliefs and strategies. Any e¢ ciency de…nition must thus account for beliefs as well as strategies. In this section we shall consider the implications of Pareto e¢ ciency de…ned on full utility functions where beliefs are correct.
Using this revised e¢ ciency de…nition we can illustrate an interesting implication of including reciprocity payo¤s. Recall P&R with neither refunds nor cost-sharing. Let n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5, player 1 be alienated and the others form a clique of strength 3. Player 1 only participating, so that players 2, 3 and 4 are all unkind to each other, is now e¢ cient as one can show that at least one clique member must get strictly lower utility in all other pro…les. Reciprocation of unkindness may not seem "normatively desirable."
In the remainder of this section we explain the main implications of our reciprocity-inclusive e¢ ciency de…nition for our game. With neither refunds nor cost-sharing it remains the case that any w participant SRE is Pareto superior to the no-participation SRE. To see this, note that all players receive strictly higher material payo¤s in former pro…le; non-participants receive zero reciprocity payo¤ in both pro…les; and participants reciprocate each others' kindness so receive a higher reciprocity payo¤ in former pro…le.
Although the ine¢ ciency problem remains, P&R's refunds may no longer recover e¢ ciency. For example, take P&R with refunds but not cost-sharing, let n = 3, w = 2, x = 0:5 and all Y ij = 0 except Y 21 > 8. Despite players 1 and 2 only participating and players 1 and 3 only participating both being SSRE, the former now Pareto dominates the latter as 1 receives the same utility and 2 and 3 receive higher utility (2 a higher reciprocity payo¤ and 3 a higher material payo¤).
While the set of SSRE may be (partially) Pareto rankable, transitivity of the Pareto criterion implies that there exists some subset of SSRE undominated by other SSRE. This subset is in fact e¢ cient overall. Take an SSRE from the subset and rule out Pareto improvements as follows: if m > w, a non-participant in the SSRE who now participates gets strictly lower material payo¤ and an identical reciprocity payo¤ (Lemma 1(b) and 1(c)); if m < w 1, a participant in the SSRE gets strictly lower material payo¤ and no higher reciprocity payo¤ (Lemma 1(a)) ; if m = w 1, a participant in the SSRE who is now a non-participant gets a strictly lower material payo¤ and a no higher reciprocity payo¤ (Lemma 1(a) ).
In Section 3 the set of e¢ cient pro…les was …xed and the reciprocity network determined equilibrium behaviour. With reciprocity included in the e¢ ciency de…nition, the reciprocity network simultaneously determines which strategy pro…les are e¢ cient and equilibrium behaviour. Is a unique and e¢ cient SSRE still attainable with cost-sharing? Recall Example 3 from Section 3.3 to see that the answer is yes: n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5 and for all i; j 2 N , Y ij = 0 except Y 13 = Y 24 = 5 and Y 12 = Y 21 = 6, implying a unique SSRE with the clique participating. This is e¢ cient since any other pro…le either involves non-provision or player 3 and/or 4 participating, hence 3 and/or 4 being strictly worse o¤. Since Proposition 3 is established by generalising the logic of this example, a unique and e¢ cient SSRE remains possible.
Networks of social preferences
One might be curious to know whether our results with reciprocity are similar to those under other social preferences models. As one may expect, our …ndings do not generally hold for other models. We identify some similarities and di¤erences to better understand what drives our results on reciprocity.
Consider simple forms of altruism (cf. Andreoni 1989) and di¤erence-aversion (cf. 
0 is i's sensitivity to payo¤ di¤erences with j. Given that our objective is to identify the drivers of our results, we use forms of altruism and di¤erence-aversion that seem comparable to D&K in the following senses: material and social preference payo¤s are additively separable; i is permitted to have heterogeneous preference parameters towards di¤erent j; and the domain of preference parameters is not bounded from above. 7 One might conjecture that equilibria with these distributional social preference models will always di¤er from reciprocity since some D&K incentives cannot exist in such models (e.g. Example 0). For a case where the sets of equilibria are identical, consider altruistic players with refunds only. Deviation from an e¢ cient pro…le, those with w participants, reduces the deviator's material payo¤ and cannot increase others'payo¤s, thus the pro…le is a strict equilibrium. As no other pro…les are strict equilibria, the set of strict equilibria is independent of ij (cf. Proposition 1(ii)), hence P&R's refund result is robust to altruism.
For a very di¤erent outcome, consider di¤erence-averse players with refunds only. Let n = 3, w = 2, x = 0:5 and for all i; j 2 N , ij > 1. There is then a unique ine¢ cient strict equilibrium with full participation! Materially e¢ cient pro…les are not equilibria as deviation secures payo¤ equality.
Comparing the above, we see that the role of pivotality over others'material payo¤s in D&K is a key driver of Proposition 1. For altruism and reciprocity, i's strategy cannot in ‡uence his social preference payo¤ if he is non-pivotal. Non-participants in a w participant pro…le thus have neither reciprocity (Lemma 1(b) and 1(c)) nor altruism incentives to deviate. For models where pivotality is not necessary for in ‡uencing the social preference payo¤ (e.g. di¤erence-aversion), non-participants may deviate and P&R may not be robust.
Altruism and reciprocity are not similar under cost-sharing. For instance, consider high social preferences to see that both altruism and di¤erence-aversion produce di¤erent result to D&K. Recall Example 4 (n = 4, w = 2 and for all i; j, Y ij = 13) and contrast the predictions to those of altruism and di¤erence-aversion with su¢ ciently high ij and ij . All pro…les with 3 participants are SSRE as the non-participant believes that no participant thought himself pivotal for the non-participants'payo¤ (Lemma 2(b)). By contrast, with su¢ ciently high altruism or di¤erence-aversion, the nonparticipant deviates to increase others' payo¤s and attain payo¤ equality. There is thus a unique strict equilibrium of full participation. The di¤erence between D&K and other models is driven by the important role of perceptions of others'behaviour in reciprocity theory, a component that is absent in other models. Now consider reciprocity networks which imply a unique SSRE. Our earliest instance was Example 1 (n = 3, w = 2, Y 12 = Y 21 = 6, for all other i; j 2 N , Y ij = 0). Multiplicity was overcome by clique members deviating from e¢ cient pro…les unless they play the same strategy, giving a unique SSRE with only the clique participating. A su¢ ciently strong altruism or di¤erence-aversion clique would analogously imply uniqueness. The models give similar results because cost-sharing implies non-participants are pivotal for participants'payo¤s.
For reciprocity we found that a clique was not su¢ cient for uniqueness due to alienation (Example 2), but having positive reciprocity sensitivies towards non-clique members achieves uniqueness (Example 3, Propositions 3 and 4). Revisit Example 3 (n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5) to see that analogous networks give uniqueness for altruism but not for di¤erence-aversion. Consider an altruism network where 12 ; 13 ; 21 ; 24 > 2 and all other ij = 0. In any pro…le with provision other than only the clique (players 1 and 2) participating, a non-participant clique member or a non-clique player would deviate, we thus have a unique strict equilibrium with the clique providing. To see the network architecture in Example 3 will not give uniqueness with di¤erence aversion, note that player 1 deviating from a pro…le where only 3 and 4 participate ( 13 > 2 (1 + 12 )) is inconsistent with player 1 not deviating from a pro…le where only 1 and 2 participate ( 13 < 1). Pivotality again drives the di¤erence. If only 3 and 4 participate, 1 is non-pivotal for 2's payo¤ so 12 and Y 12 have no in ‡uence on i's payo¤, whereas 12 does. In cases like this example, the additional requirements on parameters imposed by di¤erence-aversion preclude uniqueness.
The above comparisons highlight the important roles played by pivotality and perceptions of others' behaviour for our results on reciprocity and uniqueness. While we can …nd some instances of agreement with our model, one cannot expect our insights on reciprocity to carry over to very di¤er-ent motivations like altruism and di¤erence-aversion with a high degree of generality.
Conclusion
Societies around the world have faced and continue to face great challenges. A fundamental prerequisite to overcome many of these is the coordination of social participation. Palfrey & Rosenthal (1984) (P&R) provided an adequate and speci…c framework for exploring related issues: discrete-level public goods games, which capture the key problems of private provision of public goods in condensed form.
Reciprocity is an important form of human motivation which many scholars have suggested may matter in public goods provision settings. We have explored how the application of a formal model of reciprocity (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004 ; cf. Rabin 1993) a¤ects predictions in P&R's context, with extensions.
A new potential source of coordination power was uncovered: the interaction of networks of reciprocity incentives and cost-sharing. In the absence of cost-sharing, reciprocity does nothing to solve the coordination problem, P&R is robust. In the absence of reciprocity, cost-sharing has no e¤ect on coordination. But together, behaviour can be coordinated.
Since cost-sharing can potentially be manipulated by institution designers, understanding its e¤ects seems particularly important. While there is some experimental work in continuous contribution games (Marks & Croson 1998 , Spencer et al. 2009 ), the conditions under which cost-sharing can coordinate behaviour are poorly understood. Our work suggests that empirical exploration of its interaction with reciprocity may be worthwhile.
The precise nature of the reciprocity network matters for coordination. Properties of the network can both help coordination and hinder it. We are then left with a pressing empirical question: what does the reciprocity network look like in reality? Given its importance and the absence of empirical research on its nature, addressing this may be of interest for public good scholars.
Societies probably have new challenges waiting for them. We hope that by understanding how social participation can be coordinated, resolutions are less of a struggle, leaving more time to enjoy the public goods produced.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (Reciprocity in P&R) (i) No refunds. We identify the sets of SRE and SSRE using arguments that are independent of Y ij . First consider a candidate equilibrium strategy pro…le with no participants. Deviation by i gives him a strictly lower material payo¤ given that w > 1 and does not a¤ect his reciprocity payo¤ since for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(a) ). Thus non-participation is a SRE as well as a SSRE. Second, consider a candidate equilibrium with w participants. Deviation by i gives him a strictly lower material payo¤. If i deviates from non-participation, his reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged since for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(b)+1(c)). If i deviates from participation, his reciprocity payo¤ is strictly lower since for all j such that s j = 1, iji (1; s j ) > 0 and ij (1; s i ) > ij (0; s i ), and for all j such that s j = 0, iji (0; s j ) = 0 (Lemma 2(c)). Thus w participants is a SRE and a SSRE. To see that there are no more equilibria, take a candidate equilibrium with some number of participants other than 0 or w. If i deviates from participation his material payo¤ is strictly higher and his reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged given that for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(a)-1(c)). Thus this pro…le is neither SRE nor SSRE.
(ii) Refunds. We identify the sets SSRE using arguments that are independent of Y ij . Consider a candidate SSRE pro…le with w participants. Deviation by i gives him a strictly lower material payo¤ and no increase in reciprocity payo¤. More speci…cally, if i deviates from non-participation his reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged since for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(b)+1(c)); and, if i deviates from participation his reciprocity payo¤ is strictly lower since for j such that s j = 1, iji (1; s j ) > 0 and ij (1; s i ) > ij (0; s i ), and for j such that s j = 0, iji (0; s j ) = 0 (Lemma 2(c)). Thus w participants is a SSRE. To see that there are no more SSRE, …rst consider a candidate SSRE with more than w participants. If i deviates from participation, his material payo¤ increases and his reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged since for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(b)+1(c)). Thus this pro…le is not a SSRE. Second, consider a candidate SSRE with a number of participants strictly between 0 and w. If i deviates from participation both his material and reciprocity payo¤s are unchanged since for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(a) ). Thus this pro…le is not a SSRE. Finally, consider the candidate SSRE with no participants. Devia-tion by i gives him identical material and reciprocity payo¤s since for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(a) ). Thus this pro…le is not a SSRE.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Cost-sharing equilibria)
First show that non-provision pro…les cannot be SSRE. Consider a candidate SSRE with no participants. Deviation by i gives him the same material and reciprocity payo¤s since for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(a) ). Thus this is not a SSRE. Consider a candidate SSRE with a number of participants strictly between 0 and w. If i deviates from participation both his material and reciprocity payo¤s are unchanged since for all j, ij (0; s i ) = ij (1; s i ) = 0 (Lemma 1(a)). Thus this is not a SSRE.
Then identify conditions for provision pro…les to be SSRE. A SSRE pro…le with w participants requires that for all i such that s i = 1, u i ((1; s i ) ; (s i ; (s j ) j6 =i )) > u i ((0; s i ) ; (s i ; (s j ) j6 =i )), hence (7), and that for all i such that s i = 0, u i ((0; s i ) ; (s i ; (s j ) j6 =i )) > u i ((1; s i ) ; (s i ; (s j ) j6 =i )), hence (8) . In a SSRE pro…le with strictly more than w participants, if i deviates from non-participation his material payo¤ is strictly lower and his reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged since for all j, iji (0; s j ) = iji (1; s j ) = 0 (Lemma 2(b)). Thus a SSRE requires only that for all i such that s i = 1, u i ((1; s i ) ; (s i ; (s j ) j6 =i )) > u i ((0; s i ) ; (s i ; (s j ) j6 =i )), hence (9).
Proof of Proposition 3 (Clique with w members)
Reason as follows to see that there is a unique SSRE. First consider a candidate SSRE pro…le with more than w participants. There must exist some i 2 N nM 0 for whom s i = 1. But then for such i, (a) implies that the LHS of the inequality in (9) is equal to zero. Thus this is not a SSRE. Second, consider a candidate SSRE pro…le with w participants where the set of participants is not equal to M 0 . There must exist some i 2 M 0 for whom s i = 0 and some j 2 N nM 0 for whom s j = 1. But then for such i, (b) implies that the LHS of the inequality in (8) is at least 2w. Thus this is not a SSRE. Consider the only remaining candidate SSRE where the set of participants equals M 0 . For all i 2 M 0 inequality (7) is satis…ed given (b) and (c). The inequality in (8) is satis…ed given (a). Thus this is the unique SSRE.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Clique with > w members)
Reason as follows to see that there is a unique SSRE. First consider a candidate SSRE where the set of participants is a proper subset of M 0 with strictly more than w participants. Given (c -) there must be some i 2 M 0 such that s i = 1 for whom P j2M nfig Y ij 2w (w + 1) =x. But then for such i, inequality (9) does not hold. Thus this is not a SSRE. Second, consider a candidate SSRE where there are strictly more than w participants and the set of participants is not a subset of M 0 . There must be some i 2 N nM 0 such that s i = 1. But then for such i, inequality (9) does not hold given (a). Thus this is not a SSRE. Third, consider a candidate SSRE where there are w participants. There must exist some i 2 M 0 such that s i = 0 for whom inequality (8) does not hold given (b) and (c + ). Thus this is not a SSRE. The …nal candidate SSRE pro…le is where the set of participants is M 0 . Inequality (9) holds given (c -) and (c + ). This is the unique SSRE.
